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The main objective of this study is to highlight the importance of political instability, 
defined as frequent changes in and of government, in undermining the Russian 
exchange rate based stabilization program of the 1990s. The empirical evidence 
supports the significance of political instability along with economic fundamentals in 
determining Russian real effective exchange rate and exchange market pressure, used 
as a proxy to the crisis.  
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1 Introduction 
 
In its early years of transition and after experiencing a mini currency crisis,
1 Russia in 
consultation with the International Monetary Fund implemented an exchange rate based 
stabilisation programme in 1995 with the objective of achieving single-digit inflation, 
financial stability, and growth. From June 1995 to redenomination of ruble in January 
1998,
2 the management of exchange rate within a band and tighter monetary stance 
resulted in low prices. A combination of low inflation, high interest rates, and rising and 
relatively stable oil price until mid 1997 strengthened the demand for ruble (Figure 1). 
These developments signalled stability of the economy and opened the way for 
‘euphoric’ capital inflows during 1996-97. 
 
Two exogenous shocks ended this time of euphoria: successive devaluations in a 
number of East Asian economies in the second half of 1997 and sharp decline in oil 
price from January 1998 onwards. The first shock prompted capital outflows during late 
1997 from the Russian economy. The Central Bank of Russia was initially able to 
defend the resulting pressure on ruble but then it was forced to finance the (persistent) 
budget deficit by redeeming maturing treasury bills on behalf of the government.
3 The 
weakness in oil price that was visible in late 1997 turned into sharp decline by mid 1998. 
The Brent in London was close to $ 17 per barrel in January 1998 but went below $ 12 
per barrel by August 1998;
4 causing further deterioration in investors’ confidence and 
the second wave of capital outflows began in May 1998 that eventually resulted in the 
crisis of ruble in August 1998. 
 
Although the pegged exchange rate based stabilisation program achieved its objective 
of low inflation, there remained no improvement in Russian fiscal imbalances and 
internal and external obligations; along with their un-sustainability due to sluggish 
economic growth. As these fundamentals are one of the leading predictors of currency 
crises,
5 Russian economy remained highly vulnerable throughout the period of 
stabilisation program. In this respect, therefore, Russian crisis of August 1998 was 
standard and does not offer new insights. 
 
If we focus, however, on the political realities of those times, there is considerable room 
for an alternative explanation of the crisis. In particular, we argue that much needed 
structural and policy reforms to make Russian markets and institutions compatible with 
those of free-market driven international standards were eschewed by a remarkable 
political instability during the 1990s. Due to the frequent changes in and of government, 
the general political climate in Russia was not conducive for the implementation of 
                                                 
1 In October 1994, ruble depreciated by nearly 20 percent. 
2 In the redenomination, three zeros were slashed from the ruble. 
3 This resulted in increase of net credit to government by 14.7 percent in the last quarter of 1997. 
[Dabrowski et al. (2001)] 
4 The figures on oil price are from International Financial Statistics Database. Russia relies heavily on oil 
and gas receipts for its foreign exchange earnings. As noted by Antczak (2001), a dollar decline in the 
price of oil barrel costs Russian exporters $ 1.2 billion losses in revenue per year. 
5 See, footnote 7 for a parsimonious list of the leading predictors of currency crises.   3
coherent or consistent policies. This actually undermined the pegged exchange rate 
based stabilisation program and eventually culminated in the 1998 crisis. 
 
Thus, the main objective of this study is to highlight the importance of political instability 
in determining Russian crisis; in particular, the role of frequent changes in and of 
Russian government during the decade of 1990s. In Section 2 we motivate this 
hypothesis by presenting an overview of the economic fundamentals and political 
realities of Russia. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy to determine Russian real 
effective exchange rate and an index of exchange market pressure, both used as a 
proxy to the crisis. Section 4 gives findings of the regressions. Concluding remarks 
follow in Section 5. 
 
2 The Motivation 
 
Right from the launch of stabilisation programme in mid 1995 until the eruption of crises, 
Russian economy remained fragile due to its dismal growth rates with climbing internal 
and external obligations, and above all due to persistent and unsustainable level of 
budget deficit that accompanied inconsistent revenue collection. These fundamentals 
remained weak and highly crisis-prone from late 1996 onwards (Table 1 and 2). Thus, if 
viewed within the predictions of first-generation model of currency crises,
6 this instability 
should hardly be a matter of surprise. Both at theoretical and empirical levels, the 
aforementioned fundamentals especially that of fiscal imbalances are thoroughly tested 
predictors of currency crises.
7  
 
Therefore, we can hardly doubt that the policymakers, both domestic and international 
who remained involved in Russia during its transition and its exchange rate based 
stabilisation programme, were not aware of the growing vulnerabilities of the economy 
especially from late 1996 onwards.
8 Arguing on the same line, some economists have 
noted that apart from fundamentals’ weaknesses in the economy it was domestic 
structural and institutional weaknesses that eventually resulted in the August 1998 
Russian crisis.
9 Initial conditions in Russia at the time of the launch of stabilisation 
programme lacked necessary financial and legal infrastructure to comply with the newly 
acquired status of a free market economy. With this handicap, it was rather demanding 
to meet certain monetary and fiscal targets consistent with a pegged exchange rate 
                                                 
6 As observed by Desai (2000) and Kharas et al. (2001). 
7 Following the seminal work of Krugman (1979) and Obstfeld (1986), a fairly large number of empirical 
studies on the determinants of currency crises have emerged. Generally, they suggest GDP growth, 
budget deficit, domestic credit, external debt, real exchange rate misalignment, current account deficit, 
inflation, and foreign exchange reserve loss as the leading determinants of this financial instability. A 
parsimonious list includes Blanco and Garber (1986), Cumby and Van Wijnbergen (1989), Goldberg 
(1994), Pazarbaşıoğlu and Ötker (1997), Ötker and Pazarbaşıoğlu (1997), Frankel and Rose (1996), 
Klein and Marion (1997), Esquivel and Larraín (1998), Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart (1998), Masson 
(1999), Rodrik and Velasco (1999). 
8 See, similar comments of Stanley Fischer, Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund 
at the time of Russian crisis, in Kharas et al. (2001: p.62). 
9 Lamfalussy (2000), Summers (2001), and Poirot Jr. (2001).   4
policy.
10 While we are in complete agreement with this consensus, we forward the 
hypothesis of political instability that actually undermined the much-needed structural 
and institutional reforms.  
 
During 1990s the most pressing sphere of political instability in Russia remained the 
conflict of interests between the executive (the president and the ministerial cabinet) 
and the legislative (the parliament or the State Duma) bodies of the government. In this 
regard a major crisis emerged in October 1993 that led to the dissolution of the 
parliament. This was followed by parliamentary elections and a referendum on a new 
constitution in December 1993. As noted by Balino et al. (1997), the elections resulted 
in a parliament that was nearly evenly split between the reformers (30 percent), 
centralists (30 percent), and the nationalists (40 percent). 
 
The referendum on new constitution resulted in the separate survival of the executive 
and the legislative with larger powers to the former in cabinet formation. The nearly 
evenly split parliament meant difficulties in the adoption of new reforms. The separate 
survival of executive and legislature meant their unaccountability to each other thus 
encouraging promotion of own interests at the cost of long-term conflicts and reduction 
in decision-making capacities of the state. The larger powers to the executive in cabinet 
formation led to frequent changes in and of governments. 
 
The decade of 1990s was characterised by frequent changes in the Russian 
government. In the time period 1991-99, Russia had seven prime ministers and 
arguably more than seven governments. With the exception of Viktor Chernomyrdin’s 
first stint none of the other Prime Ministers were able to keep their seats for more than a 
year.
11 The apparently long tenure of nearly five years of Viktor Chernomyrdin was 
however marked by changes in the First Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers, and Deputy 
Ministers by, mostly, the President of the Russian Federation.
12 In addition to this, there 
were two major reshuffles in the Prime Minister Chernomyrdin’s cabinet: one in August 
1996 and the other after just six months in March 1997. The changes in and of 
governments characterised the short tenures of other Prime Ministers as well. 
Moreover, abrupt and unexpected changes of the heads of important institutions, such 
as Central Bank or State and Federal Tax Services, remained relatively frequent. 
Appendix A provides a detailed overview of these changes. 
 
Kounov and Sitnikov (1999) note that the process of budget adoption and execution 
involved the interests of executive and legislative bodies of the government at different 
levels, without any checks or controls to each other. Consequently, allowing the 
                                                 
10 The only highlight in Russia’s institutional and structural reforms besides liberalisation of its capital 
markets was the April 1995 Bank Law; it empowered the Central Bank of Russia for independent 
formulation and conduct of monetary policy and prohibited its direct lending to the government. 
11 The list of Russian Prime Ministers in the 1990s: (i) Yegor Gaidar: Nov 1991–Dec 1992; (ii) Viktor 
Chernomyrdin: Dec 1992–Mar 1998; (iii) Sergei Kiryenko: Mar 1998–Aug 1998; (iv) Viktor Chernomyrdin: 
Aug 1998–Aug 1998; (v) Yevgeny Primakov: Sep 1998–May 1999; (vi) Sergei Stepachin: May 1999–Aug 
1999; (vii) Vladimir Putin: Aug 1999–Dec 1999.  
12 See, Granville (2001) for a rather intriguing description of the different, sometimes surprising, 
dimensions of the personality of Boris Yeltsin as the President of Russia in the 1990s.   5
president to finance his re-election campaign from government funds and the 
parliament, by using its power over the budget adoption, to serve lobbyist interests. 
Furthermore, the bureaucracy greatly benefited from this conflict, since they remained 
unaccountable to the state organs in either the budget process or otherwise. Therefore, 
political instability and the immunity of bureaucracy from accountability provided 
accommodating framework for the promotion of a corruption culture. 
 
Apart from the grass roots in the 1990s, corruption was rampant at the top level of 
business and political circles.
13 In this regard, the special interest groups, popularly 
known as oligarchs, remained rather infamous for their role as tax evaders. According to 
the widely referred Corruption Perception Index of the Internet Centre for Corruption 
Research, Russia was ranked as 47, 49, 76, and 82 most corrupt countries in the world 
in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999 respectively.
14 The perception of Russia as a corrupt 
country in the international media therefore greatly undermined the confidence of, 
especially, international investors. 
 
In effect, the underlying rationale for forwarding the notion of political instability is that 
the frequent changes in and of government did not allow much room for the 
implementation of coherent or consistent policies, which exasperated the structural and 
institutional weaknesses in dire need of reforms. In fact, continuous political instability 
reflects in persistent budget deficits and for that matter external debts, low revenues, 
and low growth rates.
15 Therefore, assuming then that the deterioration of fundamentals 
were the only determinant of ruble collapse would be a narrow approach. 
 
3 Estimation Methodology and Data 
 
In capturing the effects of political instability in undermining the pegged exchange rate 
stabilisation programme, we use time series data and the estimation methodology is 
based on a general form of a short run model of the following specification:
16
                                                 
13 Levin and Satarov (2000) provide a comprehensive review of the corruption culture in Russia. 
14 Rank 1 is the least corrupt; see, http://www.gwdg.de/  for further details. 
15 See, Özler and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman et al. (1992), and Alesina et al. (1992) for positive 
association between political instability and external debt, inefficient tax system, and low growth. In fact, 
the literature on political economy approach to macroeconomic policy offers incisive observation on the 
persistence of budget deficits. In this regard, two concepts for the Russian experience are relevant. First 
of these concepts, as modelled by Alesina and Drazen (1991), is known as ‘war of attrition’. A typical 
example to explain this phenomenon between conflicting political groups is an unsustainable budget 
deficit. The deficit is often demanding to close down due to lack of political agreement, which has to do 
with asymmetric information among key political figures; that is, who bears the cost of stabilisation. Thus, 
the higher the number of political parties in a legislative council, the higher the likelihood of conflict and 
the harder to reach agreements. Similarly, the second of these concepts ‘political instability and deficit 
bias’, as modelled by Alesina and Tabellini (1990), notes that alternating governments disagree over the 
composition of public spending that give rise to budget deficits. Typically, the unstable the political 
system, higher the political polarisation or the likelihood of a government change, the stronger the deficit 
bias. In effect, the delay in stabilisation stemming from political instability may last until it becomes 
extremely costly; for example, in a currency crisis. 
16 To exploit the time series information to the maximum, initial idea was to estimate a model within the 
error correction framework. This methodology could not be used due to the stationarity of one dependent 
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In Equation (1),  y  denotes the dependent variables.
17   is the dummy variable 
assuming 1 in 1998 (the year of crisis) zero otherwise. C , the variable of prime 
importance in this study, is the index of changes in and of government used as a proxy 
to the political instability (see, Appendix C for details). 
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x is m-dimensional vector of 
exogenous variables that includes the leading indicators of currency crises, which are 
selected on the basis of Russian experience and the seminal literature. n lags of the 
variables describe the dynamics of the system. ξ  is the error term. 
 
With two different dependent variables, the model is estimated twice: once with real 
effective exchange rate and once with exchange market pressure (a variable for 
measuring the speculative activity on a currency irrespective of exchange rate regime). 
In particular, we estimate the determinants of real effective exchange rate and 
exchange market pressure in line with our main hypothesis of political instability, the 
Russian experience discussed above, and the predictions of first- and second-
generation models of currency crises.
18
 
We use real effective exchange rate (REER) and exchange market pressure (EMP) as 
proxy to the pegged nominal exchange rate and therefore as dependent variables for 
estimation purposes. A common approach to measuring REER is based on the average 
of a common purchasing power parity relation vis-à-vis each trading partner country. 
However, we make no attempt to calculate it and take the series directly from 
International Financial Statistics database. Note that the increase REER index amounts 
to its appreciation. Our objective is to find the determinants of REER in light of our 
discussion of the Russian crisis in the preceding section. 
                                                                                                                                                             
relationship was found that would be significant in the error correction model. The analysis then had to be 
restricted to the short run. 
17 If the endogenous variable is integrating variable of order zero, that is I (0), then it is not differenced. 
18 The reason for estimating the above model twice with two different dependent variables is to establish 
the robustness of political instability as the determinant of Russian crisis. Choosing real effective 
exchange rate and exchange market pressure as a proxy to Russian crisis, on the other hand, stems from 
two main problems that are often associated with estimating the crisis of a pegged exchange rate. First, if 
the exchange rate is restricted by some administrative regulation then modelling it is nearly impossible 
since the series does not exhibit any variance. The best determinant of a pegged nominal exchange rate 
would then be a constant. The artificiality of the series automatically excludes the possibility of the 
significance of other variables in the regression. Second, in the empirical content to the currency crises 
literature, the common approach to modelling currency crises seizes on methods based on probability 
analysis. While this method might be more relevant in a multi-country analysis, in a single-country case 
the weakness of this approach relates to the fact that the available sample would exhibit only one crisis 
period. In fact, this very much depends upon the definition of a crisis. By taking, for example, 20 percent 
depreciation of nominal exchange rate that happens only once in the sample could actually be interpreted 
as an outlier. It is then difficult to explain quantitatively events that were observed only once. 
Nonetheless, by using a proxy series to the pegged nominal exchange rate, such as real effective 
exchange rate or a variant of an indicator measuring the market pressure on exchange rate could help 
overcome the first problem. The problem of outlier could be tackled by actually estimating the 
determinants of the aforementioned proxies.    7
In calculating our second dependent variable, the EMP, we follow Weymark’s (1995) 
method. In words of Weymark (p. 278): “Exchange market pressure measures the total 
excess demand for a currency in international markets as the exchange rate change 
that would have been required to remove this excess demand in the absence of 
exchange market intervention, given the expectations generated by the exchange rate 
policy actually implemented.” In other words, exchange market pressure actually 
measures the size of the exchange rate change that would have occurred if the 
authorities unexpectedly refrain from intervening in the foreign exchange market.
19 
Irrespective of the exchange rate regime, negative values of EMP indicate a downward 
pressure (appreciation) on the exchange rate whereas positive values indicate upward 
pressure (depreciation) on the exchange rate and can be associated with a speculative 
attack. Therefore, our objective is to test for the variables that cause increase or 
decrease in this variable. 
 
Based on our discussion before, the empirical part of the literature on currency crises, 
and data availability, the initial set of explanatory variables was large as there could be 
many potential determinants of currency crises.
20 This study reports only those 
variables that proved to be significant in the estimated equations. As mentioned before, 
a crucial factor for the explanation of the Russian crisis is a proxy to the general political 
environment. Therefore, to illustrate the impact of political instability on dependent 
variables’ behaviour, we use the probit estimation methodology to calculate the 
estimated frequencies of the probability of a change in and of government (CHGOVT).
21  
 
This investigation is based on a quarterly sample from 1994:Q2 to 2001:Q4. Seasonally 
adjusted data were taken from the International Financial Statistics and the OECD 
databases. To establish the time series properties of all the variables used, we applied 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. For consistency in our short run model 
[Equation (1)], the non-stationary variables were transformed into stationary and logs of 




The model is estimated on both REER and EMP using general-to-specific approach; in 
both cases Equation (1) is estimated by using the ordinary least square method. The 
estimation of Equation (1) with REER as dependent variable produced the following 
results (with t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
                                                 
19 In Appendix B we detail the methodology and calculation of this variable. Exchange market pressure 
measures the excess demand/supply for/of foreign exchange reserves associated with exchange rate 
policy; or, the actual exchange rate change required by the degree of external imbalance and 
presence/absence of speculative activity. 
20 Note that (fundamental) determinants of REER are more or less the same as of currency crises. See, 
for example, Montiel (1999a) and (1999b) for the determinants of real exchange rate and footnote 7 for a 
parsimonious list of the determinants of currency crises. 
21 See, Appendix C for detailed description of the methodology and results.    8
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R-squared (adjusted): 0.71    D-W statistic: 1.77 
 
All variables are significant and signs of their parameters correspond to our 
assumptions. The obtained results suggest that growing real GDP causes real effective 
exchange rate to appreciate. Similarly, increasing oil price carry the same effect on the 
dependent variable. In effect, the positive association of both these variables reflects 
confidence in the Russian ruble. 
 
On the other hand, the variables that undermined the confidence in ruble are domestic 
credit, external debt, and political instability. The former two variables, in fact, are 
representative of Russian fiscal imbalances. In effect, expanding domestic credit and 
increasing external debt results in the weakening of currency. 
 
Political instability as reflected in the frequent changes in and of government with two 
lags enters the above estimated equation as highly significant. The coefficient of 
CHGOVT, the prime concern of this study, captures the effects of general political 
climate of Russia on the ruble REER. As shown, the negative association of this 
variable with REER implies that higher political instability reduces the confidence in 
currency. Thus, this confirms the importance of political factors as a determinant of 
Russian currency crisis. 
 
The second version of Equation (1) with EMP as dependent variable produced the 
following results (with t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
1
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t t t
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    ( 1 b )
22
R-squared (adjusted): 0.68    D-W statistic: 1.63 
 
Speculative activities on the Russian ruble therefore were driven by domestic inflation 
rate, ratio of domestic credit to real GDP, oil prices, and probability of changes in and of 
government. 
 
With the exception of inflation rate, the determinants of speculative activity on Russian 
ruble are nearly the same as of the Russian REER in Equation (1a). While a negative 
coefficient of oil prices with two lags signify the strengthening of the demand for ruble, 
positive coefficients with the rest of explanatory variables indicate the weakening of the 
demand with their increase. 
 
                                                 
22 The dummy for crisis year, , was not significant in this estimate. Similarly, domestic credit in levels 
was also not significant and the estimate was done using the ratio of domestic credit to real gross 
domestic product. 
98 D  9
The variable for political instability, CHGOVT, enters with one lag in this estimate. The 
positive association of this variable with EMP index reflects that with the increase in 
political instability the speculation on ruble also increases. This is the second 
confirmation of political instability as the determinant of August 1998 Russian crisis. 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This study has argued that the political instability was an important factor behind the 
collapse of the Russian ruble in August 1998. Frequent changes in and of government 
undermined the implementation of much needed institutional and structural reforms. 
The reforms were highly crucial in achieving the monetary and fiscal targets consistent 
with the exchange rate based stabilisation programme launched in 1995. Inability to 
implement consistent and coherent policies to achieve, primarily, fiscal balances was an 
equally important determinant of Russian crisis. This inability stemmed from the 
continuous political instability that remained one of the main highlights of Russian 
transition in 1990s. 
 
The empirical exercise undertaken in this study confirms this hypothesis. By using real 
effective exchange rate and an index of exchange market pressure as a proxy to the 
Russian crisis, we estimate a general form of a short run model with more or less same 
set of explanatory variables. The estimates show that along with domestic credit 
(variable used to capture the effects of fiscal imbalances) and oil prices, political 
instability as signified in the frequent changes in and of government turns out to be 
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Appendix A: Changes in Government and Significant Events, Apr 1994 – Mar 2002 
 
Month  Change in Government  Significant Event 
1994
Aug    Russian grain market in crisis after 
Roskhleboprodukt (trading company responsible 
for buying grains from farmers for authorities) 
does not get the credit from the government. 
Sep    Ruble depreciates about 19% after a speculative 
attack.  
Oct  Dismissal of Acting Finance Minister. 
Resignation of the Chairman of the Russian 
Central Bank. 
Economic Minister resigns. 
Ruble depreciates by 28%. 
Vote of no confidence is narrowly escaped by 
Viktor Chernomyrdin’s government. 
Russian fighter planes launch attacks against 
Chechen rebels. 
1995
Jun  Resignation of Defence and Interior 
Ministers 
Hostage crisis of Budyannovsk 
Vote of no confidence against the government by 
Duma 
Jul    President Boris Yeltsin admitted to hospital with 
heart complaint 
Aug    Russian bank crises erupt due to illiquidity and 
bad debts 
Sep    One day protest by teachers against low pay and 
wage arrears 
Nov  Acting Chairperson of the Russian Central 
Bank is removed 
President Boris Yeltsin leaves hospital and enters 
sanatorium 
1996
Jan  Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister 
are removed 
First Deputy Prime Minister for Economic 
Policy resigns 
Hostage Crisis in Kizlyar, Dagestan 
Feb    Miners strike, 80% of mines were put out of action 
Jun  Defence Minister sacked   
Jul    Hostilities recommence in Chechnya 
Tveruniversalbank is put under crisis 
management and later its license revoked 
Sep    Hunger strike at Primorskii Power Plant 
Dec    Coal miners launch strike 
1997
Jan    President Boris Yeltsin hospitalised 
Mar  Major cabinet reshuffle   March 27 observed as national day of strikes 
against wage arrears and social issues 
Apr  Labour Minister resigns 
Fuel and Energy Minister resigns 
Head of State Tax Service resigns 
 
May  Dismissal of Deputy Defence Minister 
Dismissal of Defence Minister 
Miners strike in Primorskii 
Jul    Former First Deputy Finance Minister accused of 
fraudulent deals 
Aug    Deputy Governor of St. Petersburg is shot 
Nov  Finance Minister and a First Deputy Prime 
Minister are demoted 
Resignation of Deputy Finance Minister 
The “book scandal” breaks 
 
 
   11








Mar  Dismissal of Viktor Chernomyrdin as Prime 
Minister 
President Boris Yeltsin falls ill with acute throat 
infection 
Apr  Appointment of Sergei Kiriyenko as Prime 
Minister and appointment of new cabinet 
takes place 
 
May    Blockade of Trans-Siberian rail road by miners 
Jun    Director of the State Statistics Committee is 
arrested 
Duma passes a bill stating that the external debt 
of Russia has reached unsustainable levels and 
threatens sovereignty 
Jul    Chairman of the State Duma Defence Committee 
is shot 
Aug  Dismissal of Prime Minister Sergei 
Kiriyenko and his cabinet 
Viktor Chernomyrdin is reappointed Prime 
Minister but Duma rejects the appointment 
Currency and financial crisis break out 
Sep  Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia 
resigns 
Yevgeny Primakov is appointed Prime 
Minister 
Head of Federal Tax Service is fired 
 
Oct   Nationwide  strike 
President Boris Yeltsin hospitalised with 
pneumonia 
Dec    Tekobank is declared bankrupt 
1999
Apr     Chief coordinator of Liberal Democratic Party is 
murdered 
May  Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov is sacked 
Sergei Stepashin is appointed Prime 
Minister 
Impeachment initiative on President Boris Yeltsin 
by Duma fails  
Aug  Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin is 
dismissed 
Vladimir Putin is appointed Prime Minister 
Unrest in Chechnya restarts 
Bomb explosion in a shopping mall in Moscow 
Sep    Bomb explosion in South East Moscow, in South 
Moscow, and in Volgodousk 
Russian troops move into Chechnya 
2000
Feb    The Moscow arbitration court declares Inkombank 
bankrupt 
Aug    Bomb explosion in Moscow 
Sinking of Kursk 
2001
Mar  Reshuffling of the government  No-confidence vote against prime minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov 
2002
Mar  Head of the Central Bank resigns   
Source: Russian Economic Trends, Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy, London: Whurr Publications 
(various years) 
   12
Appendix B: Exchange Market Pressure 
 
The calculation of Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) draws from Weymark’s (1995) in 
which EMP can be calculated as follows:  t t t r e Δ + Δ = ΕΜΡ η . Where,   is the change in 
nominal exchange rate,   is the change in foreign exchange reserves, and 
. Here,   is the coefficient of nominal exchange rate in an equation that 
characterises domestic price responsive to foreign price and exchange rate variation; 
and   is the coefficient of interest rate in a standard money demand equation. 
Implementing the aforementioned calculations, we first get the following estimates for 
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R-squared (adjusted): 0.706  D-W: 1.061 
t E P P
) 958 . 23 (
*
) 063 . 16 ( 717 . 0 878 . 0 + =  
R-squared (adjusted): 0.899  D-W: 0.304 
 
M  is the real money demand,   is the real GDP,   are the lending interest 
rates, 
RGDP INT
P  is the consumer price index, 
* P  is the U.S. producer price index, and E  is the 
ruble to U.S. dollar nominal exchange rate. All the data is from International Financial 
Statistics and OECD databases. 
 
After taking values of relevant parameters from the above estimates, we calculate the 
elasticity and then the exchange market pressure index.
23
 
Appendix C: Russian Political Instability 
 
We take the probability of unexpected changes in government as an indicator of 
Russian political instability by using the probit estimation methodology. The change is 
limited to the firing, dismissal, removal, or replacement of Prime Ministers and Ministers 
for Foreign, Internal, Defence, Finance, Labour, and Fuel and Energy; this also includes 
the unexpected reshuffling within the government. Reshuffling within the government or 
the change in Prime Minister and aforementioned Ministries as a result of elections, 
however, is not unexpected and therefore is not considered. Removal or resignation of 
the heads of important institutions such as Central Bank and Federal or State Tax 
Services is also taken into account (see, Appendix A for a detailed overview). 
 
Applying the probit estimation method on quarterly data, the dependent variable, 
change in government (CHGOVT), equals one in that quarter when there was a change 
in government according to the above definition, zero otherwise. What affects 
CHGOVT? Intuitively, the variables that might explain variations in CHGOVT can fall 
into two broad categories of economic performance and political uncertainties variables. 
 
                                                 
23 Estimated values are available from the corresponding author on request.   13
Among economic performance, we suggest three variables: (i) Real Gross Domestic 
Product (RGDP): A higher level of real GDP would reflect overall health of the economy 
and thus general satisfaction with the government’s economic performance. This would 
imply lesser likelihood of government change. (ii) Inflation (INFLT): A persistent and 
higher rate of inflation is a negative indicator of a government’s performance. Therefore, 
higher inflation would mean higher likelihood of changes in the government; (iii) Real 
Wages (RW): A low level of real wages is an indicator of dissatisfaction from the 
government, especially when an economy is dominated by public sector. An increase in 
wages would imply lesser likelihood of change in the government. 
 
Among political uncertainties, we suggest two dummy variables: (iv) Quarters (QRTS): 
This variable, first of the two political variables, is defined as the number of quarters 
from a previous change in the government. It is assumed that a greater number of 
quarters from previous change would imply a lesser likelihood of a change; (v) 
Significant Events (SEVNT): This is a dummy variable assuming a value of one in that 
quarter in which there is some development that indicates a direct or indirect affect on 
the government change, zero otherwise. Consider few examples in the case of Russia. 
Developments related to Chechnya: outbreak of conflict to peace negotiations to the 
restart of conflict; bouts of illnesses suffered by Boris Yeltsin, the President of Russian 
federation throughout the 1990s; strikes and riots; breaking of scandals; political 
murders; economic and financial crises. Thus, higher number of significant events 
would result in higher likelihood of government change (see, Appendix A for details). 
 
In generating the political instability index, or the estimated frequencies of the probability 
of a government change, we estimate a probit model with CHGOVT as dependent 
variable and aforementioned economic performance and political uncertainties as 
explanatory variables. The data on RGDP and RW is from International Financial 
Statistics database and on INFLT is from OECD Statistics database over 1994:Q2 to 
2001:Q4. In actual estimations, however, the dummy variables for capturing the effects 
of political uncertainties were not significant. Nonetheless, the probit model for the 
probability of government change due to economic performance only is given with the 
following results (t-statistics in parenthesis). 
 
13 (2.04) (1.61) (2.39) (1.98) 0.13 0.06 0.33 0.16 ttt t CHGOVT RGDP INFLT RW RW −− =− Δ + Δ − Δ + Δ 2 t −
                                                
 
 
Δ signifies that the respective variables are differenced once. All the explanatory 
variables have a priori expected signs and are significant at 5 percent level. Estimated 
values of CHGOVT from the above regression are taken as the political instability 








24 Estimated values are available from the corresponding author on request.   14
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Figure 1. Nominal Exchange Rate, CPI Inflation, Oil Price, Real Interest Rate: 1994Q1-2001Q4 
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Table 1. Key Economic Indicators, 1993-1999 
(units as indicated) 
Indicators  1993  1994 1995 1996  1997  1998 1999 
Growth
a/ -8 -12  -4  -3  1  -5  5 
Unemployment
b/ 5.7  7.5 8.9 9.9 11.3  13.3  12.3 
Wages
c/ 822.10 255.87  142.18  64.77 23.69 15.32  54.74 
Revenues





























































Source: Russian Economic Trends [Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy, London: Whurr Publications (various years)],  
             International Financial Statistics, World Development Indicators  
 
a/ percent annual GDP growth rate; figures for 1993 and 1994 are reproduced from Giannaros (2000) 
b/ unemployment rate; percent per year 
c/ percent change over previous period 
d/ government revenue as percent GDP; reproduced from Lamfalussy (2000) 
e/ billions of ruble (figures in parenthesis are percent GDP) 
f/ billions of ruble (figures in parenthesis are percent GDP); figures for 1993 and 1994 are reproduced from Lamfalussy (2000) 
g/ billions of dollars (figures in parenthesis are percent GDP) 
h/ billions of dollars (figures in parenthesis are percent GDP) 
 
 
Table 2. Government Securities and External Debt 
Year Government  Securities
a/ External Debt 
  billions of  
ruble 










1995  73.7 33.4  36.7  120.4 103.0 17.4 
1996  237.1 82.2  93.4  125.0 100.8 24.2 
1997  384.4 102.8  123.5  123.5 91.4 32.1 
1998 
b/,c/ 436.0 118.3  -  158.8  72.0  86.8 
Source: Russian Economic Trends, Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy, London: Whurr Publications (various years) 
 
a/ GKO/OFZ 
b/ Government Securities as of second quarter of 1998 (since the market was closed down on 14 August) 
c/ External Debt as of 1 January 1999 and reproduced from Pautola (2000) 
 
Table 3. Variables Used in the Estimates of Equation (1) 
Variable Type  Description  Stationarity  Status 
REER  Dependent  real effective exchange rate index  I (1) 
EMP  Dependent  exchange market pressure index  I (0) 
CHGOVT Independent  political  instability index (change in and of 
government) 
I (0) 
RGDP  Independent  real gross domestic product  I (1) 
INFLT  Independent  CPI inflation  I (1) 
DC  Independent  domestic credit  I (1) 
DC/RGDP  Independent  domestic credit to real gross domestic product  I (1) 
ED  Independent  External debt  I (0) 
OILP  Independent  Oil price; U.K. Brent, U.S. dollar/barrel  I (1) 
 